University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

10-20-1953

Burge v. City and County of San Francisco
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Burge v. City and County of San Francisco 41 Cal.2d 608 (1953).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/341

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

608

BURGE V. CITY

& COUNTY OF

SAN FRANCISCO

(41 C.2<1

[So F. No. 18876. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1953.]

LYNDLE E. BURGE, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.

/)

[1] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Presumptions: MotionsOrders-Oollateral Attack.-Ordinarily when an order or a
judgment of court of general jurisdiction is collaterally attacked, the only evidence that may be considered in determining whether order or judgment is void is the record in the
proceeding in which it was entered, and if the record is silent
as to existence of a jurisdictional fact, that fact will be presumed.
(2] Id. - Oollateral Attack - Presumptions.-If a proceeding is
wholly statutory and unknown to common law the court, even
though ordinarily one of general jurisdiction, is a court of
special jurisdiction for that proceeding, and if jurisdictional
facts do not appear of record in such proceeding, there is no
presumption of regularity.
[3] Id.-Proof of Judgments-Extrinsic Eviclence.-Where presumption of regularity of proceedings is not applicable in a
proceeding which is wholly statutory and unknown to common
law, the failure of the record to recite a jurisdictional fact
does not make judgment void, because extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove such fact except where some statute makes
record the exclusive mode of proof.
[4] Infants-Olaims-Compromise or Release.-Without statutory
authority a parent, as such, cannot compromise or release his
child's cause of action.
[5] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Whether proceedings under Prob.
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed
claim, are entitled to presumption of regularity need not be
decided on collateral attack if jurisdictional facts are established by extrinsic evidence.
[6] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Under Prob. Code, § 1431, to establish right of mother to compromise a minor's disputed claim,
it ~ust be shown, if father is not dead, that father and mother
are living separate or apart, that mother has care or custody
. [1] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 150; Motions and Orders, § 26.
[4] Release or compromise by parent of cause of action for injuries to child as affecting right of child, Dote 103 A..L.R. 500. See,
also, Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 34.
Kelt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 297; Motions, § 25;
[2] Judgments, § 296; [3] Judgments, § 540; [4-10, 12-14, 17-19]
Infants, § 2a; [11] Divorce, § 275; [15,16] Parent and Child, § 5.
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of minor, that compromise bas approval of superior court of
county wbere minor resides, and that a verified petition in
writing seeking approval of compromise bas been filed with
such court.
[7] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Although it would ordinarily be
better practice to hold a hearing on mother's petition for approval of compromise of minor's disputed claim, the statute
(Prob. Code, § 1431) does not require it. (Disapproviag in~
timation to contrary in Berry v. Ohaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 602,
660 [169 P.2d 442J.)
[8] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Amendment of Probe Code, § 1431,
in 1939 so as to provide that claim of minor against third
person may be compromised by "his father, or if his father
is dead or the parents of said minor are living separate or
apart and his motber then bas care or custody of said minor
then his mother," covers not only case of desertion or abandonment but any ease where father and mother are living
separate or apart, wbether reason therefor be desertion, abandonment, agreement of the parties or divorce.
[9] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-By using word "cUitody" in 1939
amendment of Prob. Code, § 1431, the Legislature made it clear
that if mother and father are living separate or apart, mother
has authority to compromise a minor's disputed claim if she
has custody of minor, whether she has that custody by virtue
of father's abandonment of his family, his inaltility or refusal
to take custody, or by virtue of court order awarding her
custody.
[10] Id.-Claims-Oustody.-An award of joint custody with
father would not be sWDcient to give mother authority to
compromise a minor's disputed claim.
[11] Divorce - Oustody of Ohildren - To Whom Awarded.-A
divorce decree that awards parents joint custody of cbild
leaves right to custody as it was during marriage wben they
Were living together and gives neither a greater right than
he or she had before divorce.
[12] lDfa.nts-Olaims-Oompromise.-"Custody" as used in Prob.
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minQr's disputed
claim by mother when parents are living apart and mother has
care or custody means complete or exclusive custody.
[13] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Addition of words "care or" before word "custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to com~
promise of a minor's disputed claim, indicates a clear legislative purpose not to limit mother's authority to cases in which
she has custody.
[14] Id.-Olaims-Oompromise.-Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to
compromise of a minor's disputed claim, no more limits "Care"
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to some cases of care t1.an it limits "custody" to some cases
of custody; it may not be interpreted as giving either "care"
or "custody" alternative meanings or to make either controlling
in some cases and Dot in others.
[16] Parent and Ohlld-Oustody.-Custody embraces sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including
its care; it includes right to child's services and earnings
(Civ. Code, § 197) and right to direct his activities and make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health
and religion.
[16] Id.-Oustody.-When parents are living separate or apart
a court may conclude that best interests of child and due regard for interests of pareuts require that one or other be given
complete cu;;tody, or it may award "legal custody" to one or
both parents and "physical custody" to one parent with or
without right of visitation by other parent, or physical custody may be awarded to a third person. usually a relative.
[17] Infants - Olaims - Oompromise.-ln using words "care or
custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a
minor's disputed claim, the Legislature by "custody" meant
complete custody or all rights involved in custody, and by
."care" meant what has commonly been called "physical custody" or custodial rights involved in physical care and control
of child.
[18] Id.-01a.ims-Oompromise.-If parents are living separate or
apart and mother has care or physical custody of child. she
may compromise his claims even thOUgh she mayor may not
have his complete custody.
[19] Id. - Olaims - Oompromise.-Where parents under divorce
decree have "joint custody and control" of child but mother
has "personal custody," award of personal custody gives her
physical custody and care of child and she therefore has
authority under Prob. Code, § 1431, to compromise disputed
claim of child.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. I. L. Harris, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for
defendant affirmed.
John F. O'Sullivan, MjJ1jngton, De11'Ergo, Weeks & Morrissey for Appellant.
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Clayton W. Hom,
Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Lyndle E. Burge, a minor, by his
father as guardian ad litem, brought this action against defendant city and county of San Francisco to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by him while he was a
passenger on a street-railway car operated by defendant.
Defendant filed an answer pleading as a special defense that
plaintiff's claim had previously been compromised by his
mother in a proceeding under section 1431 of the Probate
Code. Thf' issue so raised was tried separately pursuant to
section 597 of the ('.ode of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that the order approving the compromise was not
subject to collateral attack and entered judgment in favor
of defendant. Plaintiff appeals. He concedes that the attack is collateral but contends that the court had no jurisdiction ~o approve the compromise on the grounds that the
petition for approval of the compromise and the order approving it were fatally defective in failing to recite jurisdictiona1 facts and that even if these facts could he proved in
the present proceeding the record therein discloses that his
mother was without authority to compromise his claim. .We
have concluded that this contention cannot be sustained and
that the judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Plaintiff was 14 years old at the time of the accident. His
father and mother had previously been divorced. The interlocutory decree provided that "plaintiff [father] and defendant mother] have joint custody and control of the said
minor children, with personal custody in the defendant, and
the plaintiff has the right and privilege to visit said minor
children and take them out at all reasonable times." Plaintiff was one of the minor children mentioned in the decree
and lived with his mother after the divorce.
All negotiations leading to the compromise were conducted
between plaintiff's mother and defendant. Plaintiff's father
knew that the accident had occurred and that a claim had
been filed, but he did not participate in tht! compromise proceedings or become aware of the compromise until after it
had been made. Plaintiff's mother agreed to release his claim
against defendant upon the payment of $500. She filed with
the superior court a verified petition seeking approval of the
eompromise, and it was approved. Defendant paid the $500
and plaintiff's mother executed a release. The present action
was brought before plaintiff reached majoritT.
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oonsent statute did not allow maintenance of the action. The
statements in Melvin v. State, supra, 121 Cal. 16, 22, indicating that the State Agricultural Society engages in governmental activities only in conducting the state fair are inconsistent with the foregoing cases and are disapproved.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J .• and
Spence, J., concurred.

/

)

